Classical competition and regulating capital: theory and empirical evidence by Tsoulfidis, Lefteris & Tsaliki, Persefoni
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Classical competition and regulating
capital: theory and empirical evidence
Lefteris Tsoulfidis and Persefoni Tsaliki
University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Aristotle University,
Thessaloniki
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51334/
MPRA Paper No. 51334, posted 9 November 2013 07:54 UTC
Classical Competition and Regulating Capital: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Lefteris Tsoulfidis* and Persefoni Tsaliki** 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article we discuss the salient features of the classical and neoclassical theories of 
competition and we test their fundamental propositions using data from Greek 
manufacturing industries. The cross section data of 3-digit (total 91) industries of the three 
(pooled together) census years show no evidence of a direct statistical relationship between 
the degree of concentration and profitability. The econometric analysis of time series data 
for 2-digit industries lends support to the hypothesis for the long-run tendential equalization 
of incremental rates of profit to the economy’s average.  
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1. Introduction 
Classical economists viewed competition as the mechanism through which economic 
phenomena become independent of “people’s will” and give rise to regularities which are 
amenable to abstract theorization. For instance, J.S. Mill notes: “only, through the principle 
of competition has political economy any pretension to the character of science. So far as 
rents, profits, wages, prices, are determined by competition, laws may be assigned for them. 
Assume competition to be the exclusive regulator, and principles of broad generality and 
scientific precision may be laid down, according to which they will be regulated” (J.S. Mill, 
1848, p. 147). It is important to point out that in this often- cited quotation J.S. Mill simply 
states what competition does and not what competition is. Classical economists viewed  
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competition as a process of rivalry among firms in their incessant struggle for survival. The 
condition sine qua non for success of firms in this struggle is the reduction in their unit cost 
of production in order to undercut prices and expand their market share at the expense of 
their rivals. The most effective reduction in cost is through innovations which are mainly 
associated with the investment in fixed capital and also reorganization of the production 
process.  
By the mid-1870s, this realistic notion of competition was gradually replaced by the 
neoclassical static notion of competition in which the number of firms in the market is the 
decisive feature of the degree of competition. The fewer the firms, the higher the 
imperfection in competition and the higher the profitability of the top firms of the industry. 
By contrast, competition becomes “perfect” when the number of firms becomes infinitely 
large and each of these firms possesses a tiny fraction of the whole market. In such an 
industry, the firms merely react to parametrically given prices by selecting the level of 
output which is consistent with the maximization of their profits. In short, in perfect 
competition there is no price-cutting behavior, which is equivalent to saying that the very 
essence of real life competition is spirited away. In fact, in such an environment firms do 
not really compete with each other.1 Neoclassical competition also abuses the law of one 
price. When the law of one price is combined with the complete absence of price-setting 
capacity by firms and the absence of evolutionary change due to technological progress, 
firm heterogeneity is destroyed. Hence, all firms will have the same technology, same 
managerial strategy, same marketing strategy, and produce a product of identical quality 
with an equal share of the market by all firms within the industry. There will be no threat of 
entry from firms operating in other industries because all are earning the same rate of profit. 
Game theory flourished because neoclassicals are unhappy with the textbook analysis of 
competition, but there is no generally agreed upon game which characterizes a competitive 
industry. At the other end of the spectrum are Austrian economists, who do have a process 
theory of competition and who are not concerned with the number of firms in the industry.  
                                                 
1 For detailed discussions of the neoclassical conception of competition and its comparison with the 
classical see inter alia the papers by Clifton (1977), Shaikh (1980), Eatwell (1981), Weeks (1981) 
Semmler (1984) and Bina (1985, ch. 6). 
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The purpose of this paper is to test the fundamental tenets of these two alternative 
theories using data from the Greek manufacturing industries. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the most important features of the alternative 
conceptions of competition. Section 3 investigates the extent to which the degree of 
concentration in Greece changed over time and also subjects to empirical testing the 
hypothesis of a direct relationship between the degree of competition as measured by the 
usual variables and profitability. Section 4 discusses the extent to which there is a long-run 
equalization of profit rates between industries. Finally, Section 5 concludes and makes 
some remarks about the direction of future research efforts 
 
2. Static and Dynamic Conceptions of Competition 
The static notion of competition is associated with neoclassical economics, which is taught 
in the standard microeconomic theory. In this approach, competition is viewed as a state of 
equilibrium, where perfectly informed agents producing a product exactly like their “rivals” 
operate in a market with no entry or exit barriers. In such an environment, each agent in and 
of itself cannot affect the market outcome and simply reacts to parametrically given prices. 
The number of participants in an industry and their size relative to the market defines the 
degree of competition, and when the number of participants is sufficiently large and the 
market share of each participant is relatively small one expects a uniform profitability 
within and across industries. By contrast, as the number of participants diminishes, 
phenomena such as oligopolistic or monopolistic behavior arise, which lead to differential 
profitability between firms within the industry but also between industries. One of the 
fundamental propositions in standard microeconomic theory is that the presence of profits 
over and above the average is attributed to market imperfections and to the degree of 
monopoly power of firms over market forces. In such non-competitive equilibrium, some 
prices remain higher than their marginal cost and society underutilizes its resources.  
Historically, within the neoclassical approach to competition there are two major lines 
of research. The first comprised by proponents of monopolistic competition arguing that the 
actual economy is characterized by imperfections giving rise to distortions and by 
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theorizing these imperfections propose specific antitrust and regulation policies in order to 
correct the actual economic life and make it look more like perfect competition. This 
approach originating from economists from Harvard University (with main representatives 
Edwin Chamberlin, Joe Bain and John K. Galbraith) naturally has been characterized as 
“imperfectionist”. The antimonopoly legislation and government regulation of industry 
instituted in the USA and have been subsequently adopted, to a great extent, in a number of 
European countries is rooted into this “imperfectionist” approach. It is important to stress at 
this point that these imperfect competition models were further elaborated in the recent 
decades so as to become part of New Trade Theory and New Growth Theory. And yet 
lurking under all these imperfect competition models was the fundamental faith in perfect 
competition. As Krugman and Wells (2006, p. 365) point out “[…] much of what we learn 
from the study of perfectly competitive markets-about costs, entry and exit, and efficiency-
remains valid despite the fact that many industries are not perfectly competitive.”  
On the second camp, there are economists arguing, on both methodological and 
empirical grounds, that there is no such a thing as “monopolistic” or “oligopolostic” 
competition and the actual economic life is not in any empirically significant deviation 
from the ideal model of perfect competition. Historically, these economists are associated 
mainly with the University of Chicago, with chief representatives George Stigler, Milton 
Friedman and Arnold Harberger. Naturally, the approach of these economists has been 
characterized “perfectionist” and the relaxation of antimonopoly legislation in the USA and 
also the ideas for deregulation that swept the globe in the past few decades is attributed to 
the perfectionists’ arguments. 
In the ensuing debates, the “perfectionists” view dominated over the “imperfectionist” 
in the first postwar decades, but from the late-1970s onwards the imperfectionists made a 
strong comeback by modeling, this time, their views of monopolistic competition in a more 
rigorous way and by providing the much-needed (but not necessarily well formulated as 
this can be judged by the results) microfoundations to the current macroeconomic theory. 
Fierce as it may have been the debate between the economists in the two camps, it is 
recognized that, at the end, they both, perfectionists and imperfectionists, assumed the 
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importance of perfect competition. The imperfectionists use the perfect competition 
concept as a yardstick to gauge the extent to which real economic life differs from the 
perfectly competitive one, while the perfectionists argue that there are no significant 
differences between the actual and the perfectly competitive economy. It is interesting to 
note that the pro-market conclusions of the perfectionist approach are reached using time 
series data spanning over a long period of time. However, such an approach is at odds with 
the neoclassical concept of competition, an essentially static approach for it is oriented to 
the study of market forms and not to organizational changes of enterprises that take place 
over time. 
In the neoclassical conception of the interindustry equalization of profit rates, we 
observe that the mechanism that restores equilibrium is approximately the same with the 
classical economists (Flaschel and Semmler, 1987; Duménil and Lévy, 1987). The idea is 
that profit rate differences from the average (normal) rate of profit are caused by external 
shocks (in preferences, technology, costs and the like) which sooner or later dissipate, 
unless there are further external shocks or barriers to free mobility of resources that prevent 
the convergence of profit rates to the economy’s equilibrium average profit rate. It is 
important to stress that, in the usual neoclassical analysis; the emphasis is placed on the 
entry or exit as well as the number of firms and not on the acceleration or deceleration of 
capital accumulation.  
Figuratively speaking, the equalization of profit rates in neoclassical economics is 
visualized as an initial displacement from equilibrium at time t1, as a result of a positive or 
negative external shock and sooner or later the individual rates of return to their equilibrium 
position and stay there, unless the economy or the industries are hit by more shocks (see 
Figure 1). If the path of the rate of profit of an industry remains above the economy’s 
average over time (the dotted line in Figure 1), this is taken as an indication that such an 
industry possesses (some sort of monopoly) power over market forces.  
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Figure 1. Neoclassical Process of Convergence 
 
 
 
The dynamic notion of competition is found in the writings of classical economists, 
Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1821) and John Stuart Mill (1848), who theorized 
competition as a process characterized by the free mobility of capital and labor that in the 
long-run leads to the equalization of profit rates across industries. For classical economists, 
the mechanism for the elimination of inter-industry profit rate differentials is the flow of 
capital (and not necessarily of firms) in and out of industries in its relentless effort to take 
advantage of profit opportunities. For example, Ricardo (1821, pp. 88-89) notes “[t]his 
restless desire on the part of all the employers of stock, to quit a less profitable for a more 
advantageous business, has a strong tendency to equalize the rate of profits of all, […] 
There is perhaps no manufacturer, however rich, who limits his business to the extent that 
his own funds alone will allow: he has always some portion of this floating capital, 
increasing or diminishing according to the activity of the demand for his commodities.” 
This process of capital flows by no means implies that overtime there is equality of profit 
rates between industries, but that the equalization is only tendential and is established on an 
average and after the passage of long time. At any moment in time one can only observe 
differences, small or large, between an industry’s profit rate and the economy’s average. 
r average 
ri 
rj 
time 
Rate of profit 
t1 
r monopoly 
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More specifically, in this turbulent equalization the profit rates orbit around the economy’s 
average rate of profit and only over a long period of time, the positive and negative 
deviations cancel each other out, and, therefore, equalize the interindustry profit rates to the 
economy’s average (Figure 2, below). Alternatively, in the classical competitive process the 
interindustry profit rates are mean-attracted variables. Furthermore, it should be mentioned 
that classical profit rate equalization involves large and small firms all of which are price-
setters, whereas the neoclassical perspective it assumes that the firms are tiny price-takers.   
 
Figure 2. Turbulent Equalization of Interindustry Profit Rates 
 
 
Both the neoclassical and the classical approaches to competition would share the view 
for the equalization of profit rates between industries. However, there are important 
differences between the two approaches as the neoclassical would begin with the 
equalization of profit rates which is disrupted by an exogenous (positive or negative) shock. 
The industry affected by such a shock its rate of profit would be displaced away from the 
average and in the absence of further shocks it would converge asymptotically back to its 
raverage 
ri 
rj 
time 
Rate of profit 
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initial position (see Figure 1).2 Convergence at a rate of profit above the economy-wide 
average is also possible but this would be prima facie evidence of the presence of 
monopoly power caused mainly by imperfections in the operation of the market. Such 
imperfections may include various barriers to entry, risk, government regulation and the 
like.  
By contrast, in the classical approach to competition there is no convergence, but 
persistent fluctuations of industries’ profit rates around the economy’s average; hence, the 
profit rate of any particular industry will be different from the average; however, over a 
sufficiently long period of time these deviations from the average cancel each other out and 
their sum is not expected to be different from zero.  
The analysis of competition in Marx is an extension and further elaboration of the 
analysis of the classical economists. Marx theorizes competition as a process of rivalry 
involving units of capital struggling for survival, which in conditions of capitalism is 
manifested in the insatiable desire of capital to expand its profits as a condition sine qua 
non for survival. The desire for profit drives each unit of capital in rivalry with anything 
that stands as an obstacle to fulfilling its primary objective. This rivalry is what Marx 
defines as competition which is not restricted to capitals struggling over market shares and 
profits but it extends to include various other competitions. For example, competition of 
capital against workers in the labor process to increase productivity and reduce unit cost of 
production. The details of this type of competition have been discussed extensively in vol. I 
of Capital and have been widely read for their social consequences (length of working day, 
division of labor, automation, etc.). Capital against state for the decrease in taxation and the 
lifting of various government regulations; state against state over markets and sources of 
raw materials. Some other competitions may also include workers against workers over 
employment positions, and many more. In short, capitalist competition in Marx is viewed 
as “war of all against all” or according to Heraclitous famous dictum “war [=competition] 
                                                 
2 There is no obvious reason for smooth or quick convergence in a neoclassical model. Neoclassical 
economists have models of cobwebs in agricultural production and cycles of above and below 
average profitability in capital-intensive manufacturing. However, neoclassical models do require 
homogeneous firms. 
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is the father of all and king of all”. Marx’s analysis, however, is not limited to these war-
like social aspects of competition but expands to analyze the economic results of this 
universal rivalry in capitalism that gives rise to law-like generalizations which Marx 
developed in the third volume of Capital.  
This view of competition as a process of rivalry between firms can also be found in the 
works of Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and the modern Austrian economists (e.g., Kirzner, 
1987). In the various Austrian strands to competition, the entrepreneur is a pivotal figure 
assuming the risk and uncertainty that are inherently built into the system in which 
individuals grope toward equilibrium. The trouble with the various Austrian approaches to 
competition is that they are simply critical to the unrealistic aspects of neoclassical 
competition, without managing to formulate their own approach into a workable model and 
in so doing to demonstrate their alternative in a coherent manner. This is not, however, the 
case in Marx’s analysis, where there is a clear distinction of competition between firms 
(units of capital) that are activated within industries and competition between industries. 
Such a distinction across interindustry and intraindustry competition is not developed 
neither in the writings of classical nor Austrian economists, where often the two types of 
competition are intermingled and so the theoretical insights of these economists could not 
develop to a fully operational model.3 In neo-classical economics we do find the 
distinction; nevertheless, it is made for formal and not analytical and substantive reasons, 
inasmuch as all firms, regardless where they are activated are assumed to gain the same rate 
of profit, and, therefore, the distinction of competition between and within industries is not 
used to explain the different phenomena associated with each type of competition.4  
                                                 
3 In the exceptions are included the efforts to operationalize the Schumpeterian view of competition 
in the works of Nelson and Winter (1982) and other evolutionary theorists although there has not 
been significant progress. In similar vain, one could include Baumol’s (1982) contestable market 
hypothesis which however did not generalize to include industries other than specific ones.  
4 It is interesting to note at this point, in addition to the classical and Austrian traditions there is 
another important anti-marginalist and anti-monopoly capital approach developed by the Oxford 
Economists’ Research Group, in particular the work of P.W.S. Andrews. Moudud (2010, ch. 2) 
shows that P.W.S. Andrews contributions rule out the notion of competition as a market structure 
and his pragmatic approach bears striking similarities with the classical approach to competition. 
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By contrast, in Marx the distinction of competition between and within industries is 
being made for substantive reasons, as he identified certain phenomena caused by the two 
“moments” of competition. Thus, competition within industries establishes a uniform price; 
the famous “law of one price” which Marx (1894, p. 865) stated it as follows, “competition 
can only make the producers within the same sphere of production sell their commodities at 
the same price”. The “law of one price” is a tendency generated by cost cutting firms in 
their continual struggle to obtain and maintain a cost advantage. As a consequence, the law 
of one price is a manifestation of cost differences between firms activated within an 
industry, which gives rise to excess profits or losses and therefore makes possible the 
transfers of values within industries from the less to more efficient firms. Hence, it is 
important to note that both classical and neo-classical perspectives also share the law of one 
price. This law has enormous implication; for instance, in international trade the law of one 
price is being used to establish the purchasing power parity hypothesis; in the labor markets 
to advocate that there is no racial or gender discrimination, and that wage differentials 
simply reflect skill differences; in product markets price differences represent differences in 
quality; and managerial and marketing strategies advocate the idea that everybody behaves 
the same way. The Marxian concept of competition also uses the law of one price, but when 
combined with the notion of regulating and sub-dominant capitals produces heterogeneity 
in all of the areas neoclassicals posit homogeneity. The idea is that as all firms in the 
industry sell at the same price the differences in their unit costs gives rise to differential 
profit rates. There are differences in unit costs of production because of differences in the 
vintages of physical capital, differences in managerial strategies, differences in marketing 
strategies, and differences in non-labor input costs. Hence, a single price combined with 
inter-firm differences in competitive structure may accommodate within-industry 
differences in profitability. 
In the other moment of competition between industries, the main phenomenon that we 
expect to identify is the tendential equalization of profit rates. For example, Marx notes that 
“[w]hat competition, first in a single sphere, achieves is a single market-value and market-
price derived from the various individual values of commodities. And it is competition of 
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capitals in different spheres, which first brings out the price of production equalizing the 
rates of profit in the different spheres. The latter process requires a higher development of 
capitalist production that the previous one” Marx (1894, p. 180). The interindustry 
equalization of profit rates implies that industries with high capital requirements per unit of 
output (or labor) are expected to display profit margins on sales higher than those industries 
with low capital requirements per unit of output (or labor). Furthermore, industries with 
high capital requirements tend to respond to variations in demand more with variations in 
their capacity utilization and less by price changes. As a result, capital intensive industries 
are expected to display relatively more stable prices, profit margins (on sales) and profit 
rates for every percentage change in demand. These phenomena of competition (high profit 
margins, sticky prices and reserve capacity) are often interpreted as evidence of the 
presence of monopoly power, however these are precisely the expected, and, therefore, 
normal results of the equalization of profit rates between industries.5 Equalization of profit 
rates takes place among regulating capitals. Combined with the law of one price, it implies 
that competition is associated with persistent inter- and intra-industry difference in the rate 
of profit. 
 
 
3.  Concentration and Profitability in Greek Manufacturing 
Industrial organization studies for the Greek economy, in general, and for its manufacturing 
sector, in particular, are rare; those few studies usually measure concentration ratios at the 
2-digit industry aggregation level (Tsaliki and Tsoulfidis 1998, Kaskarelis and Tsoulfidis, 
1999). In the present study, we employ data at the 3-digit industry detail providing a 
classification of 91 industries for three manufacturing censuses (years 1978, 1984 and 
1988) conducted by the National Statistical Service of Greece. The concentration ratios of 
the industries refer to the employment base,6 whereas our proxy for profitability is the share 
                                                 
5 For further discussion see Shaikh (1982) and Semmler (1984) and for empirical tests of these 
propositions see Ochoa and Glick (1992) and Tsaliki and Tsoulfidis (1998). 
6 We measure the employment of the top four firms of each of the 91 large-scale industries, that is, 
the firms that operate in these industries employ at least ten workers, as a percentage of the total 
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of gross profits estimated in producer prices and therefore include no indirect business 
taxes to total sales of large-scale industry.7  
The regressions between the so-estimated profit margins on sales (PMS) against the 
concentration ratio of the top four firms in the industry (CR) did not display a statistically 
significant relationship. In fact, the coefficient of determination was found to be 
indistinguishable from zero and the coefficient of the independent variable not statistically 
significant. The simple regressions with the Herfindahl Index (ΗI) of concentration 
provided similar results with those of the CR of the top four firms in the industry for the 
two years of the analysis. Furthermore, in non-linear regressions the results are negative for 
the neoclassical theory of competition. Hence, the correlation of profitability with the 
degree of concentration is too weak and does not lend support to the view that the 
concentrated industries necessarily display higher profitability as a result of their monopoly 
power. 
An inspection of the data reveals that in the period between the years 1984 and 1988 
there has not been any fundamental change in the structure of the Greek manufacturing.8 
Furthermore, the concentration index of the top four firms for the three years does not 
reveal any significant change, as this can be judged from the summary statistics that we 
report in Table 1. The results are similar for the HI.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
employment in the industry. The data come from three censuses conducted by the National 
Statistical Service of Greece and refer only to employment. Unfortunately, there are no data on sales 
the usual base for many studies. It is recognized though that both bases (employment or sales) are 
highly correlated (see also Scherer and Ross, 1990 and Sawyer, 1981) and are therefore likely to 
give rise to qualitatively similar results.  
7 Data on profits and sales for the year 1978 are not available; thus our analysis is essentially 
restricted to the years 1984 and 1988. Nevertheless, we report the concentration index of the year 
1978 to show that the changes in the degree of concentration are rather slow.  
8 Droucopoulos and Papadogonas (2000) using unpublished data of the year 1992 also find that the 
concentration indexes pretty much remain the same over the years.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Concentration Indexes in Greek Manufacturing 
 CR-78 CR-84 CR-88 HI-78 HI-84 HI-88 
Mean 0.451 0.435 0.423 0.101 0.096 0.089 
Median 0.452 0.404 0.398 0.075 0.065 0.069 
Maximum 1.000 0.965 0.972 0.530 0.508 0.540 
Minimum 0.040 0.049 0.045 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard deviation 0.242 0.230 0.229 0.101 0.098 0.088 
Coefficient of variation 0.536 0.528 0.542 0.998 1.015 0.981 
 
 Note: 91 observations, the numbers following CR and HI are the years.. 
 
In what follows we pool together the data on CR of the top four firms and Herfindahl 
index along with the profit margins on sales and we present in pairs the one variable against 
the other. We observe that the CR and HI are too closely related and each of these two 
variables is not connected in any systematic way with the profit margin on sales, an 
absolutely acceptable measure of profitability in neoclassical analysis. The reason why we 
chose the profit margin on sales as an index of profitability is that the neoclassical analysis 
is interested in profits per se irrespective of the base on which these profits are being 
estimated. And in the absence of detailed capital stock data (available only at the 2-digit 
industry level) we restricted the presentation to the share of profits in total sales, i.e., the 
profit margin on sales. The data on sales unfortunately are not available for the year 1978 
and so we pooled together only the data of the years 1984 and 1988. From the scatter 
graphs of the combination of pairs of these variables (CR, HI and PMS presented in Figure 
3) it is of great interest the horn-like pattern of the CR4 and HI which is quite usual in this 
type of studies.9 The visual inspection of the concentration indexes and the profit margin on 
                                                 
9 The horn-shape relationship between the CR and the HI was theoretically and empirically 
investigated in Kwoka (1981) and Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986). The implications of the 
horn-shaped relationship is that the HI is a superior measure of the degree of concentration relative 
to the CR of the top usually four firms. The CR4 tends to overestimate concentration of the top 
firms, whereas the HI as it takes into account the size distribution of all firms and squares the shares 
of each of these firms gives more weight to the top firms. At this point it is enough to note that the 
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sales reveals no relationship of the variables involved something that is supported by our 
statistical findings.  
Figure 3. Measures of Concentration vs. Profit Margins 
 
 
This lack of statistical significance is conferred in Table 2 below, where the lower triangle 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables at hand along with their 
                                                                                                                                        
two measures of concentration are not out of touch with each other and this result is also derived in 
our study. 
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statistical significance as this can be judged by their probability values shown in 
parenthesis, for the years 1984 and 1988. The upper triangle of Table 2 displays estimates 
of the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, whose advantage over the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients is that they account for possible nonlinear relations. The 
probabilities shown in the parentheses indicate statistically insignificant correlations 
between profit margin on sales and concentration ratios, with the exception of the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the variables PMS (1988) and HI (1988) 
and between PMS (1988) and CR (1988) which are statistically marginally significant at 
the 5% and the 10% level of significance (p-values: 0.05 and 0.07, respectively).  
 
Table 2: Pearson’s and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients 
 
 CR-84 CR-88 
 
HI-84 HI-88 PMS-84 PMS-88 
 
CR-84 - 0.932 
(0.00) 
0.978 
(0.00) 
0.900 
(0.00) 
0.108 
(0.30) 
0.147 
(0.16) 
CR-88 0.928 
(0.00) 
- 0.915 
(0.00) 
0.978 
(0.00) 
0.180 
(0.08) 
0.190 
(0.07) 
HI-84 0.886 
(0.00) 
0.792 
(0.00) 
- 0.894 
(0.00) 
0.105 
(0.32) 
0.144 
(0.17) 
HI-88 0.796 
(0.00) 
0.871 
(0.00) 
0.801 
(0.00) 
- 0.207 
(0.04) 
0.204 
(0.05) 
PMS-84 0.052 
(0.62) 
0.132 
(0.21) 
0.037 
(0.73) 
0.188 
(0.07) 
- -0.004 
(0.99) 
PMS-88 0.142 
(0.17) 
0.163 
(0.12) 
0.145 
(0.17) 
0.112 
(0.29) 
-0,041 
(0.70) 
- 
 
 
The results of the statistical analysis are definitely negative for the neoclassical and in 
general the quantitative hypothesis of competition, in which the number of firms (degree of 
concentration) in an industry decides for the intensity of competition and by extension the 
level of profitability measured by the profit margin on sales.10  
                                                 
10 P. Mason (1994) reports similar results for the concentration ratio and profit margins on sales for 
the US economy and this should not come as a surprise as the results that have established the idea 
of concentration rate were very weak from the very first study by Bain (1951) and then the literature 
has shown all possibilities for a summary of these studies. For a review of studies of various 
countries see Sawyer (1981, ch. 6) and Schmalensee (1989, p. 975). 
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4.  Equalization of Profit Rates across Industries 
The empirical analysis so far has been static, since we examined the extent to which profit 
margin on sales are positively correlated with the concentration indexes. The results overall 
show that there is no statistically significant relationship between profit margin on sales and 
the two measures of concentration. The next step is to test the long-run tendential 
equalization of profit rates in Greek manufacturing industries. For this purpose, and also 
due to the lack of data on for capital stock and investment for the 3-digit industries, we 
restrict ourselves to 2-digit industries of the Greek manufacturing. We begin with the 
analysis of the (weighted) average rate of profit of each industry and its deviation from the 
weighted average. In this analysis it is important to note that the rate of profit is usually 
estimated as profits over capital stock of the same time period. In reality, and also being 
consistent with the classical analysis, the profits must be estimated on capital advanced in 
the beginning of the production period, whereas profits are collected at the end of the 
production period with the sale of the products. Thus, a more realistic measure of profit rate 
should include capital advanced lagged by one period. Furthermore, in the capital advanced 
one must, in principle, include wage and materials along with the other capital stock 
(structures and equipment). However, for modern industries in general and manufacturing 
in particular, the wages advanced must be a limited percentage of the total capital outlays, 
which business people could easily raise through the credit system, and, therefore, it is not 
unrealistic to exclude wages from the total stock of capital. The materials advanced, usually 
associated with the inventories, can be in principle estimated with the use of turnover times 
approximated by the inventories-to-sales ratio. We think that while such estimations would 
be desired, nevertheless the lack of data does not allow them in the case of Greek 
manufacturing industries. Besides, circulating capital advanced would be of much more 
importance in the estimation of the profit rate of the trade rather than the manufacturing 
sector of the economy, where there is a constant pressure for the minimization of 
inventories through the just-in-time production.  
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In what follows, we describe the model that we employ to test the hypothesis of the 
interindustry tendential equalization of profit rates. A similar formulation has been used for 
empirical studies for the U.S.A. (Glick, 1985) and for Canada (Webber and Tonkin, 
1990).11 In the more recent studies, the same questions are being pursued with the use of 
various tests of stationarity and also cointegration techniques.12 However, we opted for the 
autoregressive scheme for its economically meaningful properties which are discussed 
below.  
Let 
1
/
t t
i i i
tr S K −=  be the profit rate series of industry i, for t = 1, 2, ..., n, whereas, S and 
K stand for profits and capital stock, respectively. If  tr  is the weighted average rate of 
profit of the manufacturing sector at time t, and i it t tx r r= − is the difference of the rate of 
profit of industry i from the average of the entire manufacturing at time t. Let us suppose 
that the time series of these deviations follow an autoregressive scheme  
1 1t t tx a bx u+ += + +        (1) 
where for simplicity's sake we ignore the superscripts. Let us further suppose that the 
disturbance term ut is white noise. The autoregressive scheme of the second period gives 
2 1 2t t tx a bx u+ + += + + = 
2
1 2t t ta ab b x bu u+ ++ + + +    (2) 
and for n periods we get 
2 1
1(1 )
n n n
t n t t n t n tx a b b b b x u bu b u
−
+ + + −= + + + + + + + + +    (3) 
                                                 
11 There are two studies for the Greek manufacturing industries, by Lianos and Droucopoulos (1993) 
Droucopoulos and Lianos (1993) that pursue the question of equalization of profit rates with 
somewhat different methodology. Also the book by Mueller (1990) contains many contributions that 
use autoregression models for various countries. An autoregressive model is also used by Bahce and 
Eres (2010) in their study of Turkish manufacturing, while Mueller (1986) suggested running a 
regression of the profit rate deviations against the reciprocal of time trend raised to various powers. 
A similar model was employed in Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki (2005) and Vaona (2011).  
12 See for instance, A. Zacharias (2001) where the issue of tendential equalization of the average 
profit rates is pursued through the cointegration technique. We opted for the autoregressive schemes, 
which have been traditionally used in similar studies for they are simple and also economically 
meaningful. Furthermore, our sample size is not large enough for the efficient use of Johansen or 
other econometric techniques, whereas those techniques which are more suitable to small samples 
(and mixed order of integration) such as for example the ARDL would be cumbersome to apply in 
our case. 
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We distinguish the following three cases which are related to the three kinds of terms 
included in the last equation: 
i.  If b>1, the term in the parenthesis (in equation 3) will increase with n. If on the other 
hand, b<-1, the term in the parenthesis will increase in absolute prices as n increases 
with alternating sign. In both cases, the deviation series is not stationary, the variance 
of the series grows exponentially over time and thus it displays explosive behavior. 
Naturally, this case should be excluded from our analysis as economically 
implausible. In the border case that b=1, then the model is still not stationary and its 
long run variance increases over time as is not bounded, and the model does not have 
a static equilibrium solution. The values of xt wander without any systematic pattern. 
This behavior is not expected with our series. 
ii.  If, -1<b<1, the term in the parenthesis (in equation 3) will approximate the limit 
1/(1-b), while the second term bnxt approaches zero. If, in this case, a=0 the above 
limit equals zero indicating that the series of profit rate deviations approaches the 
mean profit rate of all industries. If a>0, the rate of profit of the industry approaches 
a limit which is above the average of manufacturing. Finally, if a<0, the rate of profit 
of the industry approaches a limit which is below the average of manufacturing. 
iii. Finally, the third term (of equation 3) which is the sum of error terms of the above 
equation. Since each term has a conditional mean equal to zero, it follows that the 
mean of the sum of the stochastic terms will be also equal to zero. In addition, each 
stochastic term is independent of the others (by assumption) and has constant 
variance, which we symbolize by σ2. Consequently, the sum of errors has a bounded 
variance equal to 2 2(1 )nb b b σ+ + + + . If -1<b<1 and n increases, the above 
expression tends to the limit [ ] 21/(1 )b σ− . If b>1 or b<-1, the variance of the stochastic 
term increases as n increases. 
 
The empirical investigation about the large-scale Greek manufacturing industries has 
been guided by the above considerations. For each industry's deviation series an estimate of 
a and b was obtained from the above autoregressive equation (1) using the ordinary least 
squares method. The value of a/(1-b) is calculated as the best estimate of a long run 
projected profit rate. The significance of the difference of this limit from zero is the 
significance of the difference of a and b from zero as well as their covariance. A closer 
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examination of the issue, however, reveals that since both the numerator and denominator 
of the fraction ai/(1–bi) are estimated parameters, it follows that the standard error of the 
above term should be estimated from the matrix of estimated covariances of the coefficients 
(Kmenta, 1991, pp. 485-491 and Green, 1990, pp. 230-234). More specifically, the 
estimated variance of the projected returns will be: 
2 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 2 ( , )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
i i
i i i i
i i i i i
a a aVar Var a Var b Cov a b
b b b b b
         
≈ + +              − − − − −            
 (4) 
In a nut sell, we define convergence as the movement of actual industry profit rate 
deviation of an industry towards the long-run average. The mechanism through which this 
convergence takes place is the inflow or outflow of capital or what amounts to be the same 
thing the acceleration or deceleration of accumulation. In other words, starting with 
disequilibrium profit rates with the passage of time and in absence of stochastic 
disturbances, the deviations tend to approach asymptotically a common value which we 
expect to be zero, that is, the case with no excess profits or losses. If convergence takes 
place at a positive value, this may be taken as evidence of some degree of monopoly and if 
it takes place at negative values this might be attributed to some sort of government 
regulation of industry. On the other hand, the term gravitation is used to indicate the 
random oscillation of actual profit magnitudes around their projected equilibrium values. 
Convergence and gravitation are intertwined and the former is a prerequisite for the latter 
(see also Duménil and Lévy, 1987 and Vaona, 2011). In terms of our autoregressive 
scheme, convergence requires the slope coefficient, b, to have an absolute value less than 
one. And gravitation requires bounded fluctuations around this trend line and this is 
ensured by the value of b, being less than one in absolute value. In this context, 
convergence refers to the deterministic part of the model and gravitation refers to the 
bounded fluctuations around the trajectory of the deterministic part of a stochastic model. 
In this case, the model is in statistical equilibrium in the sense that the standard deviation of 
each series does not display any known systematic functional form (e.g. ARCH or 
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GARCH) and approaches an upper limit. In Figure 4 below, we present the deviations of 
the rate of profit from the economy’s average for each of the twenty industries.13  
 
Figure 4. Deviations from average rate of profit, Greek manufacturing industries, 1959-91 
 
                                                 
13 The data on gross capital stock for the large scale manufacturing industries come from Handrinos 
and Altinoglou (1993) and profits are estimated as the difference between value added net of indirect 
business taxes and wages. The data are for the 2-digit large scale manufacturing industries, that is, 
establishments the employ more than ten workers. Both capital stock and profits are expressed in 
current prices. 
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The visual inspection of the graphs does not lend overwhelming support to the classical 
gravitational process and the trajectories of the profit rate deviations are far from displaying 
a convergent behavior towards zero. In order to use our autoregressive scheme, we need to 
test for the stationarity properties of each of our 20 industries. We know that in cases such 
as the deviation series of profit rates from the economy-wide average, there are many non-
linearities developed which are not captured by the usual linear unit root tests. In fact, the 
results that we derived from the usual Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests (not shown) 
were mixed and they are very likely to be contaminated by the presence of nonlinearities 
not captured by the ADF test which is based on the assumption that the deviation series of 
profit rates exhibit linear movements. However, in the turbulent kind of dynamics 
characterizing the tendential equalization of interindustry profit rates it is not unrealistic to 
hypothesize that the deviation series exhibit strong nonlinearities. These nonlinearities may 
be attributed to a host of factors ranging from uncertainty, difference in expectations, credit 
restrictions, patents, indivisibilities, government regulations and the like.  
Under the linearity framework, whenever there is deviation in industry’s profit rate 
from its long run mean, there arises a risk free profit opportunity through the forces of 
arbitrage, which in our case is reflected in the inflow or outflow of capital. However, the 
presence of such “impediments” as those described above gives rise to a threshold or band 
of “no arbitrage” on both sides of the profit rate. If the observed rate of profit deviation 
from the economy wide average crosses the threshold which in our case is zero, only then 
arbitrage is likely to occur, otherwise, the deviation series is likely that it will not tend to 
correct itself. More specifically, the visual inspection of the paths of deviation series shows 
that in most cases the rates of profits deviations series cross the zero line at least once with 
only a few exceptions. These are: industries 26 (furniture), 28 (printing and publishing), 33 
(non-metallic minerals) and 39 (miscellaneous manufacturing) where there is no crossing of 
the zero line. However in no single case we observe explosive behaviour in the upward or 
downward direction and the paths of deviation series remain in the vicinity of the zero line. 
This encourages to employ non-linear stationarity tests. 
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A simple and at the same time powerful non linear stationarity test was developed by 
Kapetanios, Shin, and Snell (2003) (hereafter, the KSS), who further elaborated and 
expanded the well-known ADF test to detect the stationarity properties in a time series. 
They keep the null hypothesis of nonstationarity as in the ADF test, but the alternative 
hypothesis is now that the series is nonlinear but globally stationary process. In order to 
understand the basis of the new nonlinear unit root test, known as the KSS test, we consider 
a model for univariate Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive of order 1, 
ESTAR(1) given as follows: 
2
1 1[1 exp( )]t t t tx x xγ θ ε− −= + − − +        (5) 
where  t = 1, …T and 2. . .(0, )t i i dε σ . The bracketed term of (5) stands for the exponential 
transitional function in the KSS test designed to capture the nonlinear adjustment of the 
series at hand. The above equation can be rewritten as  
2
1 1[1 exp( )]t t t tx xγ θ ε− −∆ = − − +         (6) 
The null hypothesis of the KSS test is that H0: θ = 0 against the alternative H0: θ > 0. 
However, because γ is not directly observable under the null, it becomes impossible to 
carry out the hypothesis testing. For this reason, Kapetanios, et al. (2003) reparameterize 
the Equation (6) using a first–order Taylor series approximation and obtained the following 
auxiliary regression: 
3
1t t tx xδ ε−∆ = +          (7) 
In order to rule out the possible presence of autocorrelation Kapetanios et al. (2003) 
concatenated in the above equation lagged terms of the depended variable according to the 
usual lag selection criteria. Thus we may write: 
3
1
1
q
t t t k t
k
x x xδ ε− −
=
∆ = + ∆ +∑                              (8) 
Where q stands for the number of lagged terms. The null hypothesis becomes: H0: δ = 0 
against the alternative H1: δ < 0. Kapetanios, et al. (2003, p. 364) recognize that the test 
statistic does not have an asymptotic standard normal distribution, and, therefore, provide 
the critical values which we use to evaluate the results of these tests displayed in Table 3, 
below. 
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       Table 3. The non-linear KSS unit-root test  
Sector 
1KSS
t  
2KSSt  3KSSt  
20. Food -2.84*** -2.55 -3.28* 
21. Beverages -1.97* -2.10 -2.06 
22. Tobacco  -3.17*** -3.37** -3.42** 
23. Textiles -2.94*** -2.63 -2.82 
24. Clothing & Footwear -9.86*** -1.80 -1.79 
25. Wood & Cork -3.05*** -3.06** 3.23* 
26. Furniture -1.98* -2.33 -2.66 
27. Paper -1.05 -1.69 -4.16*** 
28. Printing & Publishing -3.82*** -3.85*** -2.18 
29. Leather -1.94* -2.86* -3.51** 
30. Rubber -1.44 -1.41 -2.29 
31. Chemical  -1.13 -1.68 -3.14* 
32. Petroleum & Coal -4.13*** -4.33*** -4.52*** 
33. Non-Metallic Minerals -1.92* -2.16 -2.11 
34. Basic Metallic Products -1.73 -1.48 -1.49 
35. Metallic Products -2.67** -2.54 -2.53 
36. Machines (non-electrical) -2.14* -2.63 -0.36 
37. Electrical Supplies  -1.61 -1.79 -3.93*** 
38. Transportation Equipment  -4.72*** -5.27*** -5.27*** 
39. Miscellaneous Manufacturing -3.01*** -4.95*** -1.40 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 significance 
level, respectively. The symbols 
1KSS
t , 
2KSS
t and 
3KSS
t  indicate the t - Statistic that results from the 
implementation of the test to the raw data, the de-meaned data and the de-trended data, respectively. The critical 
values have been recovered from Kapetanios et al. (2003).      
 
 
The results of Table 3 suggest that for almost all industries the profit rate deviation 
series display stationarity properties for the standard confidence levels and therefore the 
AR1 scheme can be applied. In case where there is no stationarity in the raw data, the AR1 
model can be applied in the detrended data and this is the case with industries 27 (Paper) 
and 31 (Chemicals). There is an open question with industries 30 (Rubber) and 34, where 
perhaps the AR(1) model could be used in the differences of the series. However, the visual 
inspection of the graphs suggests that as these two industries cross the zero line a few times 
they are almost stationary and in fact the ADF test lends support to this hypothesis as we 
found that industry 30 is stationary at the 5% probability value and industry 34 (Basic 
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Metallic Products) was found weakly stationary with probability value somewhat higher 
than 10%.14  
Table 4 below contains the estimates of the parameters of our autoregressive scheme 
for the deviation series of profitability for each of the twenty manufacturing industries. The 
results show that the autoregressive equation (1) used in the analysis is statistically 
significant in all industries and that the value of R2 is high enough indicating that in most 
industries the autoregressive scheme explains a pretty high proportion of the variance of 
industries' profit rate deviations. Furthermore, since stationarity is a requirement for the 
application of our AR(1) scheme for industries 27 (Paper) and 31 (Chemicals) we 
detrended them first and then we proceeded with the estimation of coefficients which we 
display along with their t-ratios below the raw series.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 When we ran regressions of differences of these two series we found that the intercept and the 
slope coefficients of the regressions are not statistically different from zero, whereas the R-squared 
is near zero. 
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Table 4. Profit rate deviations from the average, Greek manufacturing Industries, 1959-
1991 
 
            
Industry a b a/(1–b) R-squared 
20.  Food 0.01 (0.9) 0.76 (5.9) 0.03 (1.0) 0.54 
21.  Beverages 0.01 (0.9) 0.69 (5.4) 0.03 (0.3) 0.49 
22.  Tobacco 0.02 (0.9) 0.84 (8.1) 0.14 (1.1) 0.69 
23.  Textiles 0.01 (0.7) 0.80 (6.0) 0.04 (0.9) 0.54 
24.  Clothing & Footwear 0.10 (2.0) 0.84 (10.5) 0.61 (4.9) 0.80 
25.  Wood & Cork 0.01 (0.3) 0.70 (5.3) 0.02 (0.3) 0.49 
26.  Furniture 0.06 (1.9) 0.79 (7.5) 0.27 (3.8) 0.65 
27.  Paper -0.02 (0.8) 0.79 (5.9) -0.10 (1.1) 0.54 
27*. Paper -0.00 (0.1) 0.48 (2.94) -0.00 (0.1) 0.22 
28.  Printing & Publishing 0.02 (0.5) 0.91 (13.1) 0.21 (0.6) 0.85 
29.  Leather 0.20 (3.2) 0.49 (3.2) 0.38 (7.5) 0.26 
30.  Rubber  0.04 (2.0) 0.58 (4.0) 0.09 (2.3) 0.35 
31.  Chemicals 0.01 (0.7) 0.92 (10.6) 0.10 (0.6) 0.79 
31* Chemicals -0.00 (0.4) 0.61 (4.71) -0.01 (0.4) 0.43 
32.  Petroleum & Coal 0.01 (0.2) 0.78 (7.6) 0.05 (0.2) 0.66 
33.  Non-metallic Minerals -0.04 (2.2) 0.66 (5.1) -0.11 (5.5) 0.46 
34.  Basic Metallic Products -0.05 (2.2) 0.70 (5.6) -0.18 ( 3.7) 0.51 
35.  Metallic Products 0.02 (1.3) 0.65 (5.1) 0.05 (1.4) 0.47 
36.  Machines (non-electrical) 0.02 (1.3) 0.81 (7.6) 0.13 (1.8) 0.66 
37.  Electrical Supplies 0.04 (1.1) 0.90 (11.5) 0.36 (1.5) 0.81 
38.  Transportation Equipment -0.04 (1.4) 0.71 (5.7) -0.12 (1.8) 0.52 
39.  Miscell. Manufacturing 0.07 (0.4) 0.831 (9.6) 0.43 (0.5) 0.75 
 
Note: Industries with an asterisk have been detrended prior to the application of AR1 
 
From Table 4, we observe that the estimates on b are significantly different from zero 
at p=1% in all industries, the absolute values of t-ratios (shown in parenthesis) are pretty 
high which means that the confidence interval of the estimated parameters are in the 
vicinity of the estimated coefficient which is always much less than one in absolute value 
and only in three industries, 28 (Printing and Publishing), 31 (Chemicals) and 37 (Electrical 
Supplies) are in the vicinity of 0.90 which means that there is increased probability for 
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explosive behavior as the b coefficient may exceed one. Thus, we have an attraction 
(usually weak) for the deviation series of all twenty industries towards their long-term 
(equilibrium) value determined by the ratio a/(1-b). However, as was mentioned above, 
since the limit a/(1-b) is a ratio of two estimated parameters; we must compute its standard 
error from the covariance matrix of the coefficients. From the results displayed in Table 4, 
we observe that six industries —clothing and footwear (24), furniture (26), leather (29), 
rubber (30), non-metallic mineral products (33) and basic metallic products (34)— out of 
the twenty industries display a value of a/(1-b) statistically significant at p=5%. From these 
six industries the profit rate deviation series of the non-metallic mineral products (33) 
together with the basic metallic products (34) industries are attracted to the projected rate of 
profit, a/(1-b) less than zero, whereas in the other four industries the difference series is 
attracted to a positive projected rate of profit, that is a rate of profit higher than the 
economy’s average. From these four industries, only in three —clothing and footwear (24), 
furniture (26) and leather (29)— the projected rate of profit differs from zero in an 
empirically significant way, whereas in the rubber industry (30) the difference of the 
projected rate of profit from zero is statistically significant at p<10%.15 Thus, our empirical 
finding with respect to the rate of profit do not lend overwhelming support to the classical 
idea of gravitation of industry profit rates to the economy-wide average rate of profit, since 
in six out of twenty industries the results show gravitation to a rate of profit different from 
zero and in four from these cases the projected rate of profit varies from 9% to 61% and in 
the other two cases the projected rate of profit is negative. These results may lend support 
to the view that various impediments to free mobility of capital and also risk associated 
with some activities, government intervention and regulation of industries may give rise to 
profit rate (positive or negative) differences from the long-run average rate of profit.  
The hypothesis of equalization of profit rates has been tested so far in terms of the 
average profitability of each industry against the economy’s average and the statistical 
results were mixed with respect to the hypothesis of tendential equalization of profit rates. 
                                                 
15 As noted above for industries 30 and 34, if they are non-stationary the AR1 scheme cannot be 
applied; on the other hand, by differencing them, the two series become stationary but also with not 
much economic interest. 
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However, it has been pointed out, that the rate of profit on regulating capitals is the relevant 
variable to the hypothesis of the tendential equalization of profit rates between industries. 
Botwinick, for instance notes: “empirical investigations attempting to utilize Marx's 
analysis of competition between and within industries must be careful to distinguish which 
profit rates are being observed - individual, regional, industry average or regulating [...]” 
(Botwinick, 1993, p. 154). In this sense, an industry’s average profitability that has been 
used in a number of studies is not necessarily the appropriate index of profitability that 
attracts the investment flows.16 The idea is that the average rate of profit measures the 
profitability of all the firms comprising the industry and in this average are included firms 
using advanced technology and have excellent location and firms with outdated technology. 
By taking the industry’s average, we may not select the type of capital which is 
representative of the vitality of the industry and is targeted by prospective investors. As a 
result, the rate of profit of these firms (capitals) is the relevant for it sets the rhythm of 
capital accumulation in the industry. 
 
5. The Incremental Rate of Profit and its Components 
In the analysis of competition in Marx’s Capital, we stumble upon the following 
seemingly contradictory situation. On the one hand, the rates of profit are equalized across 
industries and, on the other hand, there is a stratification of the rates of profit between 
firms (capitals) within the same industry. How can these contradictory observations be 
reconciled? The idea is that the average rate of profit is the average of all firms comprising 
the industry, and an industry consists of firms that use the latest technology and ideal 
location and firms with outdated technology. Classical economists were aware of these 
limitations in the flows of capital, and, therefore, they considered as the relevant rate of 
profit not necessarily the mean rate of profit but rather the type of capital where expansion 
or contraction of accumulation takes place. It is interesting to note that in Ricardo for 
example this kind of capital is always associated with the worse or in Ricardo’s wording 
                                                 
16 See Muller (1990) for a number of studies about different countries and Droucopoulos and Lianos 
(1993) for the Greek economy. These studies usually find that the deviations of profit rates from the 
average persist, a result that leads to the idea of the presence of monopolistic elements. 
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“[t]he exchangeable value of all commodities, whether they be manufactured, or the 
produce of the mines, or the produce of land, is always regulated, not by the less quantity 
of labour that will suffice for their production under circumstances highly favourable, and 
exclusively enjoyed by those who have peculiar facilities of production; but by the greater 
quantity of labour necessarily bestowed on their production by those who have no such 
facilities; by those who continue to produce them under the most unfavourable 
circumstances; meaning—by the most unfavourable circumstances, the most unfavourable 
under which the quantity of produce required, renders it necessary to carry on the 
production.” (Ricardo, 1821, p. 73, emphasis added).17 By contrast, J.S. Mill argues with 
that “[w]herever there are large and small establishments in the same business, that one of 
the two which in existing circumstances carries on the production at the greater advantage 
will be able to undersell the other. (J.S. Mill, Principles, p.131). Smith, on the other hand, 
in his pin factory, “a very trifling manufacturing”, as he notes, is certainly not identified 
with the two extreme situations, but rather with a typical which is described as the one that 
changes take place.  
Classical economists seem that they were aware of these limitations to the flows of 
capital. The characteristic example is the case in agriculture, where the most fertile lands 
are already cultivated and they are not available to new entrants who can only enter into a 
worse type of land that secures the normal rate of profit and in this sense is the “best” 
available. Ricardo (1821, p. 73 and pp. 86-87) analyzed the details of this concept of 
regulating capital which he identified with “the most unfavourable” circumstances in 
agriculture and mining and he generalized it (to our view not successfully) to the rest of 
the economy.  
Turning to manufacturing, the regulating conditions of each sector are determined by 
exactly the same method; that is, by the type of capital where expansion or contraction of 
accumulation takes place. The concept is similar to what business people and also input-
                                                 
17 Ricardo repeats his main view also in the chapter on mineral products. He notes “the same general 
rule which regulates the value of raw produce and manufactured commodities, is applicable to the 
metals; their value depending not on the rate of profits, nor on the rent paid for mines, but on the 
total quantity of labour necessary to obtain the metal, and to bring it to market.” (Ricardo, 1821, pp. 
86-87). 
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output economists (e.g., Miller and Blair, 1985, p. 75) call “the best-practice” method of 
production. This should not lead to the conclusion that all firms adopt this method of 
production immediately, since firms operate fixed capitals of different vintages and 
managers have different expectations about the future direction of demand and profitability. 
Consequently, firms do not easily switch from one method of production to another. 
However, new capitals are expected to enter into the method of production, which can be 
easily duplicated and, furthermore, the expected rate of profit is attractive enough. The 
production method which is targeted by the new entrants is usually the most recent in the 
industry and not the older or the most profitable. The older methods of production ceteris 
paribus, will have a rate of profit lower than the average, whereas the most profitable 
methods of production may not be easily reproducible or their reproduction is associated 
with certain degree of risk, which new entrants may not wish to undertake. Hence, over “a 
cycle of fat and lean years”, that is, a complete business cycle, there is a tendency for the 
rate of profit to equalize between regulating capitals of industries. In other words, 
investment flows, by and large, is attracted neither by the old type of capitals because of 
low profitability nor by the very new type of capitals because they are usually associated 
with too much risk and employ new, non tested and not easily reproducible technologies 
(because of patents, better location, etc). In manufacturing, the regulating conditions of 
each industry may not necessarily coincide with the average conditions but are rather 
determined by the type of capital associated with “the lowest cost methods operating under 
generally reproducible conditions” (Shaikh, 2008, p. 167).18  
The rate of profit earned on regulating capital is, therefore, the measure of new 
investment's return and determines the rhythm of accumulation in industries. If two 
regulating capitals have different rates of profit, the investment will flow differentially and 
will not just stop flowing in the industry with the lowest rate of profit, because of 
uncertainty and differences in expectations. It is important to point out that the regulating 
conditions of production do not necessarily specify a single rate of profit, but rather a 
narrow spectrum of rates of profit. This is true even in the case of a single regulating 
                                                 
18 See Bina (1985 and 2011, chs. 1 and 6) for a discussion of the concept of regulating capital within 
the context of agricultural rent and its specific applications to the oil industry.  
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condition of production, because there are still differences in management, demand, etc. 
which may give rise to profit rate dispersions. Consequently, at any given moment in time, 
the rate of profit between regulating capitals across industries are not equal and only in the 
long run there is a tendential equalization of the respective rates of profit to an average.  
The problem with the concept of regulating capital is its quantification in real 
economies. In principle, one can distinguish these conditions by observing an industry over 
time and collecting data for a group of firms with certain characteristics that persist over 
time. Stigler’s “survivor technique” might be an example that would guide such a research 
for the identification of the regulating capital of an industry each year spanning a 
sufficiently long period of time. Clearly, such a procedure requires data which are hard to 
come by for a few industries and a few years, and therefore it would be extremely difficult 
to carry out for a long-run analysis and many industries. One way out is Shaikh’s (1995 and 
2008) idea according to which although we may not know the regulating capitals of each 
industry, however, we can estimate the profitability of these capitals through the concept of 
“incremental rate of profit on capital” (henceforth IROP). In fact, the concept of IROP is 
used in the literature of corporate finance to assess the profitability of firms and forms one 
of the “fundamentals” that investors consider in their decisions. The argument is that the 
rate of profit which tends to be equalized between industries is not necessarily the mean 
rate of profit of the total industry but rather the rate of profit which corresponds to the 
regulating conditions of production within an industry. In this context, the IROP is 
approximated by taking into account the following considerations: investment flows are 
conditioned more by short-run rate of return such as the incremental rate of profit than the 
rate of profit over the lifetime of investment. Hence, Shaikh (1995 and 2008) expresses 
current profits (St) that accrue to a firm as the sum of profit from the most recent investment 
(ρIt–1) and profits from all previous investments (S*). Consequently, we write 
St = ρIt–1 + S*      (9) 
If we subtract profits of the past period from both sides of the above equation we get 
St – St–1= ρΙ t–1 + (S* – S t–1)    (10) 
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The term in parenthesis is expected to be very small in comparison to the term ρΙt–1 and, for 
all practical purposes, it can be ignored. The justification is the view that the shorter the 
evaluation horizon, the closer the current profit will be on carried-over vintages S* to the 
last period's profit on the same capital goods (St–1). Moreover, since uncertainty and 
ignorance increase with the passage of time, it is reasonable to assume that the short-run 
(up to a year) is the relevant time horizon. After all, current profits are fraught with many 
ephemeral factors, and we know that abnormally high or low profits direct investment 
accordingly, which in turn gives rise to new uncertainty and thus profits or losses, and so 
forth. With these considerations in mind, it is reasonable to assume that expectations about 
future returns to investment are short-sighted; that is, expectations depend on the short-run 
rate of return. Consequently, the current rate of profit on new investment will be:  
ρ t = ΔS t / I t–1    (11) 
that is, the change in profits of each industry divided by the investment of the last period. 
The above configuration provides a practical way to identify the IROP=ρ since as a rule we 
do not have data on the best practice technique and the firm that utilize it over the years. 
Consequently, the motion of the IROP is the relevant index of profitability to test the 
hypothesis of the tendential equalization of profit rates for the regulating capitals. 
Alternatively, we can derive the IROP from the simple definition of the rate of profit 
(Tsoulfidis, 2010) rt=St/Kt-1 or St=rtKt-1, we differentiate with respect to Kt-1 and we get: 
1
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Where the connection between the incremental rate of profit ρt and the term dSt/dKt-1 is 
based on the usual definition of the capital stock, Kt=(1–δ)Kt–1+It, where δ is the 
depreciation rate and It is the gross investment. It follows that ΔKt=It – δΚt-1= INt = net 
investment. Thus, dSt/dKt-1≈ΔSt/INt–1=ρt. The fraction in the parenthesis above stands for the 
elasticity of profit rate with respect to capital stock for which the following hold, 
if 1
1
d 0 then 
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It can be shown that the ΙROR is a variable that encapsulates the operation of a series of 
other variables such as the wage share, productivity of labor, capacity utilization and 
capital-output ratio. In order to show the operation of all these variables we start from the 
simple definition of income (Y) and ignoring time subscripts we write 
Y = rK + wL        (14) 
whose derivative of (14) with respect to K gives 
 
d d d d d d
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and solving for ρ, we get 
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    (15) 
From equation (15) we observe that the IROP is directly related to the elasticity of output 
with respect to capital (dY/dK)(K/Y),19 the rate of capacity utilization, u=(Y/K)/(Y/K)*, the 
growth rate of productivity of labor (dY/dL)/(L/Y) and to the normal capacity output-capital 
ratio (Y/K)*. In addition, the IROP is inversely related to the share of labor income (wL/Y) 
and the elasticity of wage with respect to income (dwY)/(dYw). 
It is important to note that the IROP is closely related to another measure of 
profitability known as the internal rate of return (d) which is used in the economics of 
industrial organization and of corporate finance. In fact, starting from the well known 
formula of the internal rate of return 
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Differentiation of investment with respect to d gives 
1 1
2 3
d 2 ...
d (1 ) (1 )
t t tI S S
d d d
− += − − −
+ +
       
                                                 
19 Of course, this elasticity in the case of one-commodity world (or when the capital-labor is uniform 
across industries) is equal to the profit share of the economy. 
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If we assume that St=St+1=…S, not an unrealistic assumption, then it follows that investment 
will be more strongly negative the more the years involved. Which is equivalent to saying 
that the internal rate of return systematically favors short-term projects. If we restrict the 
analysis to a single year, then we may write,  
 
1
1t
t
Sd
I −
= −         
 
Since investment is financed mainly out of profits, it follows that the two measures of 
profitability, that is, ρ and d are strictly related to each other, and, therefore, one does not 
expect to find wild differences in the evolution of these two measures of profitability.  
In Figure 5 below we portray both the weighted average rate of profit and the IROP for 
the Greek manufacturing industries. Of course the time periods are defined by the data 
availability in investment and capital stock. Thus the average rate of profit begins from the 
year 1959 and extends until the year 1991, whereas the availability of investment data 
allows the estimation of the IROP from the year 1962. Past the year 1992 it is extremely 
difficult to extend the data set because of the change in the definitions of industries. 
Nevertheless, the time period is long enough to test the proposition of the long run 
tendential equalization of profit rates. An inspection of Figure 5 below reveals that the two 
rates of profit are not out of touch with each other and their difference, as expected, is the 
volatility of the short-run rate of profit which is the IROP reflecting all the noise and short-
run behavior in the economy. Thus the IROP orbits around the average rate of profit and 
both share a nearly common long term average.20 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The mean value of the average rate of profit is 0.47 with a standard deviation 0.10, while for the 
incremental rate of return the average value is somewhat higher at 51% and the standard deviation is 
much higher at 0.27. In short the two rates of profit share almost the same mean value although the 
variability of the IROP is about three times higher than that of the average rate of profit.  
 34 
Figure 5. Average rate of profit vs. Average IROP  
 
 
It is interesting to note that in the estimation of the IROP both numerator and 
denominator are expressed in current prices. It is important to use current prices especially 
when we refer to an inflationary period like the 1970s and 1980s, the idea is that inflation 
not only increases profit expectations but also actual profits, which in turn affect capital 
accumulation. In our previous investigation (Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki, 2005) we deflated both 
profits and investment by their respective price deflators. The results were supportive of the 
idea of tendential equalization of profit rates; however, on closer examination one might 
argue that the results were derived because of the removal of the effects of inflation though 
the deflators. More specifically the denominator of the IROP, that is, investment in constant 
prices, is usually an I(1) variable and real profits is also an I(1) variable, by taking the 
change in profits we transform the numerator to an I(0) variable and this might impose 
stationarity in the whole fraction. In the current study, we take the nominal values of 
variables and so even though we take the first difference of profits in the numerator of 
IROP still we have a non-stationary numerator. In Figure 6, we plot the IROP industries 
deviations from the average IROP for the period 1962-1992. An inspection of the graphs 
reveals that the deviation series gravitate toward zero indicating that over time the deviation 
of each industry’s IROP from the economy’s average dissipate. The time series data of the 
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differences of industry profit rates from their average is obviously stationary, and therefore 
we need no run any particular statistical test.  
 
Figure 6. IROP Deviations from the average IROP in Greek manufacturing Industries, 
1962-1991 
 
 
In order to show the long term tendency of the deviation of each industry, we use once 
again the same autoregressive scheme, which unlike the average rates of profit (where the 
deviation series did not cross over the zero line many times and we found that the center of 
gravitation of the individual deviation series was in some industries different from zero), 
we observe that the trajectories of IROP deviations cross the zero line much more 
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frequently. The visual inspection of the graphs leaves no doubt that the IROPs are mean 
reverting; however, it is not clear whether this mean is zero or some other substantially 
different from zero and statistically significant (positive or negative) number.  
In order to ascertain the mean value of each series, we need to employ our 
autoregressive scheme of first order (equation 1) to each of these twenty industry deviation 
series, whose additional characteristic is their high volatility. From this volatility, we would 
like to eliminate the exceptionally high or low frequencies of the data; the reason is that the 
noise embedded in the data may fail to give the required information of the actual behavior 
of the series. The task of isolating the frequencies that are of economic interest from those 
that are not is carried out through the use of band – pass filter and in our case we employed 
a Baxter-King filter with one lag and frequencies 2 and 8. In Table 5 below, we display our 
estimates of the intercept, a and slope coefficients, b as well as the projected rate of profit 
a/(1-b) along with their t-statistics of the filtered times series data. The R-squared is 
displayed in the last column. In the regressions that we ran, we tried autoregressive 
schemes of various lags, however, for reasons of clarity of presentation, we restricted to the 
first order autoregressive scheme, provided that the autoregressive scheme with two or 
more lags did not change the results of the econometric analysis qualitatively.  
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Table 5. Tendential Equalization of IROPs in Greek Manufacturing Industries, 1962-1992 
 
            
Industry 
 
a 
 
b 
 
a/1–b 
 
R-squared 
20.  Food -0.003 (0.09) -0.680 (5.18) -0.002 (0.09) 0.508 
21.  Beverages 0.016 (0.19) -0.654 (4.72) 0.010 (0.19)  0.462 
22.  Tobacco -0.014 (-0.09) -0.632 (3.92) -0.009 (0.09) 0.372 
23.  Textiles -0.012 (0.24) -0.213 (1.15) -0.010 (0.24) 0.049 
24.  Clothing & Footwear. -0.022 (0.26) -0.518 (5.18) -0.015 (0.26) 0.508 
25.  Wood & Cork -0.005 (0.07) -0.397 (2.56) -0.004 (0.07) 0.202 
26.  Furniture -0.015 (0.19) -0.595 (3.76) -0.009 (0.19) 0.352 
27.  Paper -0.001 (0.01) -0.496 (2.92) 0.000 (0.01) 0.247 
28.  Printing & Publishing -0.027 (0.31) -0.754 (5.53) -0.015 (0.08) 0.540 
29.  Leather 0.003 (0.01) -0.553 (3.94) 0.002 (0.01) 0.374 
30.  Rubber  -0.003 (0.07) -0.364 (2.06) -0.002 (0.07) 0.140 
31.  Chemicals 0.009 (0.11) -0.678 (5.51) 0.005 (0.11) 0.539 
32.  Petroleum & Coal -0.015 (0.05) -0.677 (4.71) -0.009 (0.05) 0.460 
33.  Non-metallic Minerals 0.007 (0.22) -0.461 (3.03) 0.005 (0.22) 0.261 
34.  Basic Metallic Products -0.002 (0.01) -0.468 (2.71) -0.001 (0.01) 0.220 
35.  Metallic Products 0.000 (0.00) -0.595 (4.18) 0.000 (0.00) 0.402 
36.  Machines (non-electrical) -0.005 (0.08) -0.657 (5.44) -0.003 (0.08) 0.532 
37.  Electrical Supplies 0.008 (0.10) -0.583 (3.66) 0.005 (0.10) 0.340 
38.  Transportation Equipment -0.024 (0.47) -0.500 (3.00) -0.016 (0.47) 0.257 
39.  Miscell. Manufacturing -0.024 (0.47) -0.500 (7.16) 0.037 (0.74) 0.663 
 
 
 
We observe that in all industries the constant term of the regressions (i.e., coefficient a) 
is not statistically significant, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is zero. The 
slope coefficient (i.e., b) is always negative and much less than one and that the projected 
rate of profit, that is the term a/(1-b) is not statistically significant and different from zero. 
The results with respect to the intercept and the slope coefficients are therefore consistent 
with the hypothesis of gravitation of our deviation series of IROPs from the economy-wide 
average IROP should fluctuate around zero. For industry 23 the estimated slope coefficient 
displays relatively smaller than the other industries t-ratio, however when we reran the 
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regression by adding a second lag the overall fit improved without affecting the projected 
rate of profit whose statistical significance remained not different from zero.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
In this article, we set out to show that the notion of competition as a dynamic process that 
has been developed by classical economists, Marx and to a certain extent by Austrian 
economists (Schumpeter, 1942, Kirztner, 1987, inter alia) is much richer than it is usually 
thought. In our view, this alternative notion of competition concentrates a number of 
interesting characteristics that can become the foundation for the development of a realistic 
theory of competition. Crucial to this approach is the notion of regulating capital whose 
general description can be found in Ricardo and other classical economists but its detailed 
development is in Marx’s Capital.  
To our view what is even more essential about the notion of regulating capital is its 
important parallels with the established prudent business practices. Furthermore, the work 
of the Oxford Group of Economic Analysis and in particular P.W.S. Andrews dissatisfied 
by the neoclassical microeconomic theory and looking to find what actually happens in the 
real economy arrived at conclusions very similar to the classical approach (Moudud, 2011). 
The same concept has also been identified in input-output analysis and the concept of the 
“best practice capital or technique” (Miller and Blair, 1985). The research of a number of 
authors in the classical tradition starting with the works of Shaikh (1995) and continues up 
until nowadays have contributed if not to the more precise identification of this type of 
enterprises but certainly to the estimation of profitability of regulating capitals as this is 
reflected in the movement of the IROP.  
The empirical analysis showed that there is no statistically sound positive relationship 
between the concentration ratio and profitability in Greek manufacturing industries, thereby 
casting doubt to the major proposition of the static notion of competition. Furthermore, the 
time series statistical analysis showed that the IROP of each of the twenty industries of the 
Greek manufacturing displayed gravitational behavior around the economy’s average 
IROP, which is equivalent to saying that there is a tendential equalization of profit rates for 
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the regulating capitals. A result which is consistent with the dynamic analysis of 
competition and encourages us to think that the analysis of competition as a dynamic 
process and the associated with it concept of regulating capital deserves further theoretical 
and empirical research.  
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